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Once upon a time, before Covid (and before children!), I had a life. I 
used to go on holiday to interesting places. It seems strange to say, 
sat here in my living room-cum-office and having worked from home 
for the past 351 days (not that I’m counting), but fewer than five years 
ago I took a very interesting holiday… 
I went to the USA to attend a friend’s wedding and spent a few days 
on the East Coast, before going on to Ecuador. Ecuador, by the way, 
is a lovely (and massively underrated) country to visit, full of gorgeous 
scenery and interesting places. 
However, one of the interesting things about Ecuador (if you’re a nerd 
like me and get excited about visiting the central bank’s museum), is 
that it uses the US dollar as its currency. As a result, it was instantly 
clear that prices in Ecuador were very, very different to the US. 
Moreover, because the two share a currency, this can’t be written off 
as being due to the vagaries of currency market (anyone who has 
travelled to or from the UK in recent years has experienced the 
dramatic change in the cost of their holiday due to currency 
gyrations). 
In the US, I winced at the cost of staying in a shady motel in a dodgy 
part of Baltimore (I told you my holidays were interesting!) In contrast, 
in Ecuador a hotel typically cost somewhere between half and one-
third of the amount of said motel and frequently included breakfast. A 
nutritious and tasty (if simple) meal could be had for $2.50 in many 
places. 
In fact, my experience was typical. Rich countries are systematically 
more expensive than poorer ones. Usually, the wealthier the country, 
the higher the cost of living. Of course there are exceptions, but as a 
general rule the phenomenon is remarkably consistent. In economics, 
this is known as the Penn effect and is widely accepted in the 
literature. Indeed, there is an entire branch of the literature devoted to 
hypotheses and models that might explain the effect and econometric 
testing of these. 
One leading explanation – known as the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis, after those who proposed it – posits that this is caused by 
relative differentials in sectoral productivity. Specifically, productivity 
differences in goods and services that are tradable are very large 
between rich and poor countries but significantly smaller in sectors 
where trade is not possible. 
Intuitively, this makes sense: manufacturing a jet engine is highly 
skilled and capital intensive, whereas labour-intensive agricultural 
work or textiles manufacturing is not. Moreover, this has ramifications 
for relative prices of goods and services in each country. Again, the 
reasons are intuitive. 
The price of a haircut differs dramatically around the world. The price 
of a pair of scissors differs by much less. Scissors are tradable – if it’s 
more expensive to buy scissors in France than in Spain then I can 
simply ship them from one country to the others. In contrast, you’re 
unlikely to switch barbers from Paris to Madrid just because a haircut 
is a few euros cheaper in Spain! 
What’s interesting is that this effect clearly also exists regionally within 
a country. Wealthy areas are systematically more costly than poorer 
ones. Pre-pandemic, a pint of decent real ale in my local used to cost 
about £3.20. My family in the South East (on the outskirts of London) 
pay about £4.50. In central London, prices of £6 or more are not 
uncommon. 
The UK is not unusual here: the same is true in the USA (compare 
Mississippi and New York), Germany (Bavaria vs. Brandenburg), Italy 
(Bari is cheaper than Milan!), France etc. What’s new is that a slew of 
recent academic work has begun to quantify these effects. It confirms 
our intuition: they are big (and often bigger in countries with larger 
inter-regional disparities). 
Why might this be the case? The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
relies crucially on immobility of labour: people can’t move easily from 
Nigeria to Norway. Clearly that isn’t true within a country. 
There are barriers to moving – upping sticks from Hull to Hounslow 
isn’t easy – but significant numbers traverse the country that, over 
time, the effect should be diluted. Recent work, however, suggests 
that in the UK at least these divergences are, if anything, getting 
bigger. 
I suspect that the explanation is housing. The data certainly supports 
this in the UK context (the cost of housing differs far more than any 
other product) and it has diverged. For many reasons, the supply of 
housing is extremely inelastic in costly locations. Moreover, it isn’t 
difficult to see the high value of many tradable products produced in 
wealthy regions. 
So what does this mean for regional disparities? A simplistic take 
would argue that this simply means that inter-regional disparities are 
not as bad as claimed and move on. That would be a profound 
mistake. 
It is true that accounting for price differences massively shrinks inter-
regional differentials in average (median) full-time wages. In fact, the 
remaining differentials are very modest and can probably be 
explained by differences in workforce composition (especially in terms 
of skills and age). However, what this hides is a tail of extremely high 
earners in wealthy regions. 
In addition, because so much of the inter-regional price differences 
can be accounted for by housing what we see is that the owners of 
that housing are the ultimate beneficiaries of higher (nominal) wages 
in wealthy regions. We should expect this to show up in (subnational) 
differences in wealth and unearned income. Insofar as we can tell 
(and statistics are somewhat patchy), this is indeed the case. 
In other words, prices are the missing link between debates on inter-
regional disparities and those on inter-personal ones (think of the 
work of anyone like Thomas Piketty). Ameliorating the former will also 
help with the latter. This matters everywhere: in the EU it has strong 
implications for cohesion policy, in the UK it profoundly affects plans 
to ‘level up’ or ‘build back better’ and there are clear policy 
ramifications in the US, China and elsewhere. Knowledge of regional 
prices will help us to target support appropriately, but it will also help 
us to design more appropriate policies because its ramifications for 
productivity are profound. This is a subject to which I will turn in a 
future blog. 
